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Estoppel Equitable Judicial
Bankruptcy | Case Law | Estoppel Equitable Judicial

ESTOPPEL--EQUITABLE AND JUDICIAL

In re Hoopai, 581 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2009)

Judicial estoppel not applied to lender’s inconsistent claims to attorney fees under Hawaii

law and § 506(b), since it did not seek a “second benefit” or “unfair advantage” from taking it’s

positions.

United Steelworkers of America v. Retirement Income Plan for Hourly-Rated Employees of,

ASARCO, 512 F.3d 555 (9th Cir. 2008)

Three factors in determining whether to apply judicial estoppel:

1) Is the party’s later position clearly inconsistent with its earlier position;

2) Whether the party achieved success in the prior proceeding; and

3) Whether the party asserting an inconsistent position would achieve an unfair advantage

if not estopped.

In re An-Tze Cheng, 308 B.R. 448 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2004), aff’d and remanded,

I160 Fed.Appx. 644 (9th Cir. 2005)

Judicial estoppel did not apply to Chapter 11 debtors who asserted one value of a secured

claim in their lien avoidance motion and a different value in their claim objection, since they were

asserting their rights as debtors in the motion and their obligation as a trustee in the objection.

Hamilton v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 270 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2001)

Debtor who failed to list insurance claim in bankruptcy schedules was judicially estopped

from asserting that claim in subsequent lawsuit. “The application of judicial estoppel is not

limited to bar the assertion of inconsistent positions in the same litigation, but is also appropriate

to bar litigants from making incompatible statements in two different cases.”

Humetrix, Inc. v. Gemplus S.C.A., 268 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2001)

Promissory estoppel is a cause of action; equitable estoppel is used to bar a party from

raising a defense or objection it otherwise would have. Use of equitable estoppel to defeat a

statute of frauds defense has no bearing on the damages plaintiff may recover.

Wyler Summit Partnership v. Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc., 235 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2000)

“The doctrine of judicial estoppel requires, inter alia, a knowing antecedent

misrepresentation by the person or party alleged to be estopped and prevents the party from

tendering a contradictory assertion to a court.”

In re Meronk, 249 B.R. 208 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2000), aff’d, 24 Fed.Appx. 737 (9th Cir. 2001)

Law firm judicially estopped from seeking bonus, where in its retention application, it

represented that it's hourly rate arrangement would result in a larger estate than a contingent fee,

but then sought a bonus that would have brought their fee to the level they would have received if

they had accepted the contingent fee arrangement.

Granite States Ins. Co. v. Smart Modular Technologies, Inc., 76 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 1996)

Under Cal. law, the elements of equitable estoppel are:

1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts;

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2) must intend that his conduct shall be relied upon, or must so act that the party asserting the

estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended;

3) must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and

4) must rely upon the conduct to his injury

See also Driscoll v. City of Los Angeles, 67 Cal.2d 297, 431 P.2d 245, 250 (Cal. 1967)

In re Canino, 185 B.R. 584 (9th Cir. B.A.P., 1995)

Equitable estoppel applied to exemption claim

In re Heritage Hotel Partnership, 160 B.R. 374 (9th Cir. B.A.P., 1993), aff’d, 59 F.3d 175 (9th Cir.

1995)

Equitable estoppel:

1) party knew facts

2. Intended that his conduct be acted upon

3. Estopping party ignorant of true facts

4. Relied to his damage

See also Hay v. First Interstate Bank of Kalispell, N.A., 978 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1992)

In re Howell, 120 B.R. 137 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1990)

Definition of equitable estoppel. Does not apply to govt. absent affirmative misconduct.

See also In re Santos, 112 B.R. 1001, 1007-08 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1990)

In re Growers-Ranchers, Ltd., 110 B.R. 915 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1990); aff’d, 945 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir.

1991)

Agency director’s promise not binding nor subject to estoppel when exceeding authority

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